ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE MODERN REVOLUTION

BY KURT RIEZLER

WHOEVER deals with the dynamics of political revolution in the industrial age should realize two hard facts.

First, the industrial age tends to create an elaborate centralized machinery of potential power. Actual power and the use of the machinery can be dispersed among different types of powerholders, agencies and departments, and thus the centralization of potential power need not be a centralization of actual power. Washington today is but one of many examples.

Second, the industrial age has refined, diversified and multiplied the technical instruments of power. If in a crisis a minority succeeds in conquering a monopoly of military weapons, means of communication, propaganda and news, and in organizing their ruthless use, no opposition from within has a chance. Today the discrepancy in potential efficiency between powerholder and any opposition is such that a ruthless minority, once in power, cannot be removed. At the same time the centralized machinery permits a monopoly of punishment and reward. This monopoly, supported by the monopoly of weapons and means of communication, is final.

These two factors distinguish the political revolution of the industrial age from any revolution of pre-industrial times.

Let us assume a state with a vast amount of organization—public, half-public or private—a more or less centralized administration. The society thinks of political revolutions in the traditional terms of a more or less fixed stratification and of economic interests—one class revolting against others, employees against employers, socialists against capitalists. But this need not be the way in which the modern political revolution actually occurs. While the different economic or social classes are watching one another, ill at ease—capitalists looking at socialists, socialists at capitalists, neither side

seeing anything else—an attack from the flank takes the society unawares in a moment when bewilderment and fear paralyze thought and action of the ordinary citizen. The group that leads the attack conquers the machinery, changes potential power into actual power, and keeps it by technical superiority. This corresponds roughly to the German model of the fascist revolution. Many specific features may be exclusively German. But the general psychological dynamism is not merely German. It belongs to industrial society in the aftermath of a total war. It is a threat to all countries, though in different ways and degrees.

The flank attack owes its success to the unwitting cooperation of three groups that are psychological but not yet economic or social classes. They have existed for a considerable time athwart the old classes, slowly taking on shape and a distinct mentality. These three classes have not yet a name. For the sake of brevity I call them the outcasts, the fools, and the experts. Defined by their mentality, they have no clear-cut lines of demarcation; nor are they mutually exclusive. First I shall describe the three classes, then the genesis of their collaboration.

I

The outcast class consists of the people who have lost their standing in the group in which they live. They are uprooted economically, socially or ideologically, and resent it. Nothing binds them to the existing order of things.[1]

This class is very old. Its members have been the best raw material for all revolutions since the wars of Cataline. They are not yet actually united. They are the social scrap of all classes and, like scrap, they are of different sizes and shapes. In ordinary times they

[1] Harold J. Laski in his new book, *Reflections on the Revolution of our Time,* recognizes the role of the outlaw in the fascist revolution. But he does not draw the consequences of the outlaw's revolutionary role, as he tries to find a place for it within the scheme of economic determinism. These consequences would demand a fundamental revision of the whole scheme regarding the relation between political and economic power. If ours is really a period of transition from "acquisitive" society to any other that could be non-acquisitive, this transition itself will give ample opportunities to ruthless minorities to conquer political power and the machinery of planning for the sake of their own power, welfare and greed, and opportunities also for a good laugh at the "period of transition."

are neither numerous nor dangerous, but an economic crisis, a social dislocation after war and defeat, increases their number and intensifies their peculiar mentality. As the crisis proceeds the differences in their social backgrounds tend to fade, the similarities come to the fore and prove to have an amazing strength.

The members of a class in the making discover one another by a particular expression in their faces. As each shares the other's resentment they learn to understand one another; a like destiny has formed a common type. If in a crisis they join forces under the guise of a popular movement a selective process weeds out the soft material and brings to the front the resolute, the ruthless and the obedient. A well organized minority, full of passion, vitality and resentment, with nothing to lose and everything to gain, waits for its opportunity.

The well-meaning citizen of a democratic country is likely to disbelieve this story, though he may be aware of the ward heelers in his own district. The Germans too refused to take these people seriously until it was too late. But any thorough scrutiny of the social background of the Nazi leaders, of the growth of the party and the different phases of its continuous process of selection, brings to light overwhelming evidence. I give but a few samples.

There is a village in a peasant countryside. Only two peasants in the village are genuine Nazis, playing a role in and trusted by the party. One is the natural son of a natural daughter of the *Schwarzbeerweib*, a woman who lives by gathering blueberries. Thus he is a man thrice despised. After the revolution he turned up as a party member, and was appointed *Kreisleiter* of the neighboring town. Familiar with all the gossip of his native village, he knows its weak spots and takes his revenge. He is a very efficient *Kreisleiter*.

The other is a small farmer, who inherited his farm from his mother. His father, of African stock, was a French war prisoner of 1870. A Frenchman would not have antagonized the peasants, but Negro blood and Moslem faith kept the son from being accepted by the village community. Now old, his one friend is the *Kreisleiter*.

Besides these two are a few farmers who are party sympathizers;

in Chicago gangs they would be called fringers. They hope Hitler will rid them of the heavy mortgages on their farms.

Let us jump now from the village to the most fashionable club of one of the leading cities. There we find an atmosphere of semi-stupidity and total boredom, with special emphasis on horseracing, bridge and gossip about the social blunders of the Socialist cabinet ministers. In such a club who are the genuine Nazis? Many members joined the party on the advice of the administrators of their estates, who held that property would be safer and profits easier if they did. All are anti-Socialists and favor a "strong" government. None has a say in the party.

There are only three genuine Nazis. One is Count A who, fifteen years before, after heavy losses on horses, mishandled some bills. The affair was settled privately by his friends, but he had to resign from the club. After the revolution he popped up as a party dignitary and had to be readmitted to the club.

Another is Count B. He had no money and married a wealthy girl, but he has so little sense that he failed in whatever else he attempted. After the revolution he joined the Nazis, was given a job in the party and achieved a feeling of success and importance. It did not help him much, though, as he could be used only to establish social relations between the party and the nobility. In two years he disappeared.

The third is Baron C, who lost his estates by gambling and carelessness. He is the gigolo of a female antique dealer whom he has helped in buying cheaply from bankrupt aristocrats and in selling dearly to social climbers. That implied some cheating and destroyed his standing.

I jump again, this time to a university. There we find fringers of various kinds, some among the professors, more among the instructors—men disgruntled for one reason or other, unable to forget prewar times or simply feeling inferior. They are used by the party but have no say in it. Who are the real Nazis?

One is a former schoolteacher, who had published some tenth-rate stuff about education. To capture the schoolteacher lobby a

university gave him an honorary degree, and his ambition fed on this honor. He dreamed of a chair of philosophy—but in vain. He joined the Nazi party as a frustrated upstart, and was the first man to be appointed by the new Nazi minister of education as a university professor. As a lecturer he is a complete failure; compulsion alone brings students to his courses. His failure increases his hate.

The other Nazis on the university staff are of the same type; they feel that they will get nowhere without political pull. The failures club together. Since the revolution they have persecuted and denounced the successful, and the intellectual level of the university has continued to decline.

I could jump from the university to a coal trade association or to any other such group. But these samples may suffice to suggest that my story is not quite unbelievable. The reasons why people are "outs," the respects in which they are "outs," differ. The type of man is the same. The common bond slowly becomes stronger than the former class differences.

An emotional movement organizes these people. The organization of a growing party means a selective process. In the German case this process started with the foundation of the Nazi party, and ended with the purge of 1934. An analysis of this selective process would show how the nature of the movement and the growth of a distinct mentality determine the direction of this selection in a unique and consistent way—vitality, ruthlessness and obedience being the only criteria. The purge of 1934, to which about 2,000 party members fell victim, clearly reveals this pattern. The purged were either those ruthless criminals who failed to be obedient and dared to challenge the Führer, or those idealists who were deficient in ruthlessness because of moral inhibitions. The Nazi movement is not, as most people think, a revolt of the lower middle class—though this class, uprooted by war, inflation and desertion, supplied, along with the unemployed, the greater part of the popular support.

The outcast class has many subclasses. One deserves special attention—the intellectually uprooted. Some of them are idealists who

have lost their particular ideal. The most important are the disillusioned officers returning from war and defeat. Of these officers the most "idealistic," in the sense of being blindly devoted to something that no longer exists, are the most dangerous: they are the natural offspring of war, defeat, humiliation and disarmament.

Others are intellectual nihilists. At college they learn that lines of conduct and thought are only socially conditioned opinions, that values are only valuations and arbitrary, that there is no difference between knowledge and opinion. A half digested sociology of opinions, which calls itself "sociology of knowledge," leaves them in an intellectual vacuum, in which nothing is true and everything is permitted. Their's is a specific function in the development of the outcast mentality. When the social order begins to question itself the intellectual nihilist has the function of providing the outcast with a good conscience, of breaking down his last inhibitions and preparing him mentally for his future role. The new power either puts the intellectual nihilist into a concentration camp or employs him on the staff of a Goebbels or a Himmler.

Before taking leave of the outcast I have to say a few words in his favor. Definition of the outcast in terms of mentality leaves out the voluntary and cheerful outcast who refuses to conform but bears no grudge. He is the salt and pepper of any society, and its most important member, though he does not regard himself as a member. He is the spur of a horse that likes to fall asleep.

This first class, the outcasts, could hardly conquer the state, even in a crisis, without the help or at least the connivance of a second class of people who have no appropriate class name. As they are conspicuous by their capacity to be fooled I take the liberty of calling them "the fools." I do not mean the ordinary fool of all times. The fool I mean is the natural offspring of the industrial age.

The development of society in the industrial age leads to an enormous complexity of social, economic, political factors, whose ramifications fewer and fewer men are able to master. This is an unfortunate but fundamental fact. In normal times, when things proceed approximately within the limited range of possibilities that

man can take into account, the fool is not a fool but is moderately reasonable. In times of crisis, when real events transgress this range and the unexpected becomes possible, man is frightened and bewildered; he cannot understand. His first reaction is to simplify and to accuse. Somebody or something must be responsible. He puts his teeth into a particular pet hate—the Jews, the socialists, capital, big business, trade unions, Franklin D. Roosevelt, the communists. It does not matter which pet hate. What matters is the blindness, the stubbornness, his passionate demand for action, for change.

At such a time many a fairly reasonable man becomes a fool, easy prey for the emotional leader and great simplifier. He does not know that he is a fool—he may even believe that he is the only one who is sane. As the crisis becomes more and more acute and less and less understandable, something happens to the bewildered soul: into it seeps a particular kind of "fear," the fear of the unknown, not of this or that thing whose nature is known, but of something for which no place is provided in our scheme of reality. He does not even know what it is or could be; its very possibility shatters his world. We talk about "collective insecurity" in times of crisis; it is not ordinary insecurity, however—the insecurity of the market that the businessman is well acquainted with—but insecurity referring to something whose nature, whose reasons, origins and consequences we neither know nor understand. It is the kind of fear on which feed the so-called neuroses, individual or collective. If the Atlantic Charter means freedom from this kind of fear it points to a definite thing that must be achieved if civilization is to survive.

The fools are numerous and diverse. But when gripped by this kind of fear they merge into one psychological class. The existing situation, they feel, is unbearable. Things must be changed, in whatever way and at whatever cost. This mood is not merely a peculiarity of the Germany of 1933, but is a sinister potentiality of our civilization, and even luckier countries than Germany received a mild foretaste of it in the perplexities of the slump years.

Among the numerous and diverse fools two subclasses deserve special description. The first group is broad and not clear-cut; to

it belong not only many theoretical Marxists but everyone who thinks about political questions in merely economic terms, assuming that political power necessarily and merely springs from economic power, political struggle being only the screen for the struggle of economic interests. If these people are capitalists they are looking at labor, if they are workers they are looking at capital, if they are the so-called intelligentsia they look exclusively at the struggle between capital and labor, and confuse by their writing and teaching the minds of both. This type of fool is blindfolded, and cannot observe what happens.

The second group is less broad, more specific; some of its members belong also to the first group. Most of them are well-to-do, commanding iron, steel or coal—members of an organization whose name varies from country to country. They think in terms of economic interests but they too are frightened, exposed to this particular "fear of the unknown." Their mentality, whether they live in the Rhineland, in Paris or on Long Island, is pretty much the same. They have a way of "hiring somebody" when they are in trouble. Thus they look at the phenomenon of the masses, an unknown animal whose movements no one can predict—and hire the outcast as an expert in handling the strange animal. If you ask, "But how can you support such a man or such a movement?" they answer: "What do you want me to do? (Was wollen Sie? Que voulez-vous?) This is the age of the masses. One needs a man who can handle the masses." Such an answer was given in many a country by many a man. Fools of this kind are not afraid of what such an instrument will do when in power. They assure themselves that the man "who pays the piper calls the tune." If you express doubt they reply, "There is no danger; he will get rich and become just like all the others." This formula, heard in Germany, has been quoted by the author of *Sabotage,* citing *Time Magazine,* as the conclusion reached by a leader of American business after reading *Mein Kampf.* "The way to tame a rebel is to make him rich—then he becomes conservative and settles down." This is the mentality of the fool who well deserves to be fooled.

Before leaving the fool I pay him, too, the tribute he deserves. The fool is at least passionate, even though he acts foolishly. Since he thinks he has a solution he challenges the wise man. And the wise man needs the challenge of the fool, for it is the plight of the human comedy that action tends to be thoughtless, thought inactive. The trouble is that a crisis multiplies the fool beyond need.

There is a third class of people: the experts. They are not numerous. They too are the natural offspring of the industrial age. Society needs, produces and rewards them. They are excellent people—efficient, reliable, devoted to their tasks. They would not come into the picture at all were it not for the specific mentality they are likely to develop. They concentrate all their capacity for thinking and learning on one more or less narrow field. Outside this field they have no knowledge, no judgment. Although they like responsibility within this field they dislike it outside, where they have no expert knowledge. The expert, by nature and habit, tends to feel helpless outside his field. His knowledge concerns means, not ends, and it is as a means that he functions, for the ends are not his responsibility; he assumes that the ends are the job of another expert. There is no expert, however, for ends. Experts like to be given a chance in their field. Full of ideas of what could be done there, they are eager to do it. Therefore they are inclined to accept the leader who can be expected to give them their "chance." They worship efficiency for efficiency's sake.

The number of these people is multiplying, relentlessly. The growing demand imposes specialization on educational institutions, and as demand and supply increase, the fields of the experts become narrower and narrower, their mentality more and more intense. They enjoy a prestige far beyond the limits of their fields. As they rise in number and prestige, men with judgment and wisdom about the general affairs of the human cosmos decline in number and prestige. The more complex the world becomes the more it demands specialization, the less it permits the growth of wisdom. This is a grave problem with which educational systems are wrestling without real success.

The class, as defined by its mentality, is wider than the class of people who are called experts. The German general is an expert. He acts according to the expert, not to the traditional army, mentality. He knows nothing about the world, for he has had no time to learn anything outside his complex field. He thinks in terms of military efficiency, not in terms of political wisdom or honor. The world is a place in which to move armies and navies. His helplessness and his eagerness to be given a chance combine in shaping his attitude. Another expert looks at the world as a place in which to build highways, to rebuild cities, to play the diplomatic game. In the books that promote a planned economy we hear the lament, "Oh, what could be done if I were only given a chance." But these plans are drawn in an economic and social vacuum; there is much idealism behind such eagerness. The world is full of desks, and the desks are full of blueprints.

Since the expert is here defined by a mentality, I apologize to the expert who does not develop the expert mentality. He deserves praise, not blame. But he has no place in the modern revolution; he is the unhappy observer.

II

In orderly times the second and third of these classes—the fools and experts—are just ordinary decent people. They have no wish to cooperate politically with the first class. But they slide unwittingly into such cooperation when, in a crisis, fear of the unknown creeps from house to house and dilutes ordinary decency. If we heed the hints given by the German example we can expect this cooperation to develop approximately along the following lines.

The fool hires an outcast to handle the masses. The outcast, supported by the fool, rides into power on the crest of an emotional movement. When in power, he fools the fool. The fooled fool sees his economic power taken over by the holder of political power. The popular movement, which was the vehicle of success, is dismissed—after some purges. There is a longer or shorter struggle between the popular movement as such—the "party" or the revolu-

tionary forces—and an authoritarian organization centered in a secret police. This struggle ends with the victory of the police. The expert, given his chance by the new power, rushes into service. The desks full of blueprints are searched for projects that the new power can use for its own ends. The service of the expert makes the new power efficient.

In this development there are two points that deserve particular attention. The first concerns the role of the bureaucracy, the second the relation of the ruthless minority to the popular movement.

What, in this scheme, is the role of the bureaucracy? The new power purges anyone in the bureaucracy who resists, and dismisses the top men unless they have developed the expert mentality. But since the vast army of the lower or middle bureaucracy goes on doing its duty—nine-tenths of the routine work is non-political—the enormous machine continues to function. In the Anglo-Saxon countries the spirit of an abstract state machinery is still in the making. Here the civil servant is still more or less a citizen before being a civil servant, a member of a society before being a part of a mechanism. Thus the Anglo-Saxon observer looks in amazement at the spectacle of the German civil servant under Hitler, or the French officeholder under Laval.

Centralized machinery develops the spirit of abstract duty; thus the ordinary civil servant feels himself responsible for a tiny part of a huge mechanism and entitled to a pension, if he does his duty. Duty and interest demand that he keep the machinery going—revolution or not. Riots on the street may prevent him from reaching his office for a day or two—but on the third day he is there, examining the tax returns for District IV, letters R to T. It makes no difference who tops the state. Governments come and go—smoothly or in violence. The state is eternal. The new power has no interest in stopping him, and upholds his duties and rights. If need be, a fiction of legal continuity is cheaply available in every case. The civil servant will take a new oath of allegiance to any new power if necessary, provided the new master demands allegiance only *im Rahmen der Amtspflicht,* within the frame of his duties to the office. This

was the formula by means of which Hitler overcame the inhibitions of the German bureaucracy.

Thus the new power inherits a nearly intact machinery. The routine work goes on, and the machinery retains its efficiency. The civil servant is neither sublime nor preposterous; it is the abstract state that is preposterous, by pretending to be sublime. The civil servant is simply human. When in times of war the peasant hides himself, his seed and his cattle for some days in the woods, while the tanks rattle over his fields, and reappears again to rebuild his barns and retill his soil when the noise, smoke and fire have subsided, we praise his devotion, patience and perdurance. As the peasant lives on the soil, so the civil servant feeds his children on his salary. He can claim to be as human as the peasant—unless it be sublime to till the soil and preposterous to file income tax returns.

Since this point meets with disbelief in Anglo-Saxon countries but may easily prove to be important in times to come, I shall illustrate the attitude by a few examples. When such a civil servant discovers that ten years ago a Jewish professor, now an emigrant, received a couple of marks less than he was entitled to, he will inform him, ask where to send the money and, if instructed to do so, pay it to a Jewish hospital—while the ruling party hunts and loots the Jews. This is no concern of his; he does his duty and pays until he receives an explicit order to the contrary. After the fall of France, when Vichy, under Nazi pressure, persecuted the Jews, Edouard de Rothschild, president of the *chemins de fer du Nord*, escaped to Switzerland. The German ministry of transportation found out his address and sent him the free ticket of the German *Reichseisenbahnen* to which he is entitled as head of a French railway system. A civil servant had no order that covered the case, and did his duty. Even now, in a world at war, the German financial authorities take some pains to find whether emigrants that are entitled to a pension are still alive; they will receive their pensions until the day they lose their title by death or by acquiring American citizenship or by a special law abrogating their rights. If the world perishes, files and accounts will be in perfect order.

The civil servant serves no regime; he serves the "order" in any regime—everyone in his tiny place. This amounts, in practice, to serving the regime in power—yet within certain limits. In Germany when the party bosses, swollen with their new power and immensely enjoying new sources of income, thought themselves above the duties of the ordinary citizen in calculating their income, the lower bureaucracy so resisted this assumption of special privilege that the minister of finance was forced to withdraw the income tax problem of the party leaders from the regular authorities and transfer it to a special office.

Millions of clerks, performing an abstract duty, live by the functioning of an abstract machinery. This machinery, lifeless and powerful, survived the republic as well as the monarchy. It will survive Nazism and the revolution to come—its units somewhat confused and bewildered, but its functioning never damaged beyond repair.

The second point that deserves particular attention concerns the relation between the ruthless minority and the popular movement. At the beginning the popular movement seems to be the main thing; its leaders, more or less petty, are hardly more than instruments. But as time goes on, the picture is reversed: the popular movement becomes the instrument, the organized power of the leader the end. The revolution is no less liquidated than the power it set out to subvert. Himmler rises in power while Hess disappears; the Brown Shirts of the Munich brown house yield to the Black Shirts of Himmler's Gestapo. In this point the fascist revolution follows the example of other revolutions.

If the inner restlessness and impatience of a revolutionary power did not easily carry the new power beyond its domestic victory into wars of aggression, but permitted the social development to proceed along a straight line to its end, the final results would be fairly predictable. The old stratification of society would be replaced by a new, and the three psychological classes would become new social and economic classes. An elite of the outcasts, the selection of many purges, would form the new upper class, enjoying all sorts of privileges and the better part of the wealth. The experts would form the

new middle class, with higher salaries and a certain amount of economic security. The fools, with all the rest of the population, would be enslaved and live in the hope that their sons might rise into the class of experts and their daughters marry into the new elite.

III

This is merely the outline of a model, a frame of orientation. While the scheme roughly fits the German case it may have no applicability to other countries, every case being unique. But though other countries will certainly deviate from this pattern, more or less and for different reasons, they may well use this model to discover the danger spots that should be watched, the safeguards that must be protected.

While the fools and experts of one country resemble those of another, there is one important difference: the civic virtues. As long as there is unquestioned belief in and allegiance to political democracy—meaning majority rule and right of opposition—we may hope that the fool will not hire an outcast for an attack on the democratic principle of legitimacy, and that the expert will not rush into the service of an illegitimate power.

There is no doubt that this particular kind of civic virtue was never a matter of course in Germany. Imperial Germany was divided between two unreconciled principles of legitimacy — the ancient one of hereditary and the modern one of democratic rule. The Weimar republic, born in defeat and confusion, was not given the opportunity, nor did it have the time or strength, to justify by successes the principle upon which it was based. In the eyes of an important part of the upper classes the democratic procedure was neither the sole nor the right source of legitimacy, and therefore civic virtues did not warn these classes against the policy of proving by sabotage that the democratic system does not work.

But however great a role we may attribute to the lack of civic virtues in the German case, countries with an older tradition have no reason for complacency. Before the crucial test no one knows the strength of civic virtues. A crisis can deadlock the democratic pro-

cedure itself; the fear of the unknown can paralyze not only the people but their government. The bewildered citizen may still cling to his civic virtues and yet not know how to apply them to the situation at hand. No one should dare assert that any modern industrial country could stand defeat in a total war without a breakdown of the social order. We cannot be sure that no fear of the unknown will arise out of the aftermath of this war if there should be a victoriously lost peace. It is the nature of the fear of the unknown that the breakdown of our world, of our scheme of order, our frame of reference, means a breakdown of our lines of conduct—with man acting no longer as a member of a group but as an atom of a crowd. The fear of the unknown puts man in a moral vacuum, and—civic virtues or no civic virtues—a helpless being eagerly consents to whatever promises to remove this kind of fear.

In regard to the outcast the differences between the various countries are obvious. So far as the loss of social status is concerned, the danger of the growth of an outcast class is the greater the more rigid the stratification of the society. In a society with flexible stratification, where social status can be gained, lost and regained, the class of outcasts will not grow to a considerable size. The man who lost his social status in Boston can hope to rise again in Omaha, and nobody cares about his past. Social scrap is reabsorbed by the social process; the gifted, active and ruthless find opportunities in local politics, in rackets, and thus the class of outcasts continually loses the fresher part of its blood. The situation in more rigidly stratified countries is different.

The growth of the outcast class in general obviously depends on the extent to which loss of social and economic status is final, that is, on the lack of peaceful opportunities. Though in this respect the United States is more fortunate than other countries, it may be safer to feel not too safe even here. First, no one knows who the outcasts are until, under the guise of a popular movement, they rally and come into the open. In the beginning there seem to be only a few poor specimens in whose importance nobody believes. With increasing state interference and regulation the failures tend

more and more to cast the blame for their own shortcomings on the state, or on the system or on the form of government—whether rightly or wrongly makes no difference. In a country that has a long tradition of what Thorstein Veblen called "self-help, collusion and cupidity," and an unbroken and youthful vitality, many a man who is not an outcast may come close to the outcast mentality when he feels his opportunities for self-help, collusion and cupidity strangled by an increasing amount of regulation in the hands of a necessarily cumbersome central authority. This specific mentality can grow out of very different conditions in different countries.

There are many other differences and numerous factors that need to be taken into account. Yet, despite all the possible variations, the model of the three psychological classes may serve to guide our thinking, worrying and acting through some of the complexities of modern society and help us to meet some of the probable perplexities of an unknown future.

Any such model can serve only as a heuristic device to give points of orientation for an inquiry into the specific nature of a concrete case. Though it is open to a diversity of possible variations, this model is restricted to political revolution in a democratic and industrial country in times of peace. A different case is presented by those revolutions that accompanied in the past, and may accompany in the future, the collapse of a state in war and defeat.[2]

The fascist revolution is not the daughter but the granddaughter of a total war—and the mother of the next war. In the aftermath of this struggle the victorious democracies will have to deal not only with a considerable amount of social, economic and mental "dislocation" in their own countries, but with defeated countries that are expected to find a way to democratic principles from total war and, even more difficult, from total defeat, and with the kind of peace that the crimes of "leaders" are likely to lead to as concrete content

[2] As I read the proofs Italy goes the way of Russia under Kerensky, of Germany in 1918. Such "revolutions," if they are revolutions, are dominated by the problem of peace. They stop for a while at whatever regime brings peace. If this is to be a "democracy," this democracy, in the aftermath of war and the misery of defeat, will be exposed to the danger of another revolution in which a ruthless minority conquers the state from a confused society.

of unconditional surrender. What this means in specific terms, both to victors and to defeated, no tongue can tell or pen of mine describe.

The world to come will be not less but more complex than the world that is gone. Millions will be uprooted. The fairest slogans of today will seem but thin vapors. Many a righteousness will become sour in bewilderment, many an idealism turn into cynicism. But the victorious powers may be able to stand the test at home, and a decade of enormous fatigue may give a breathing spell to the European continent. Within that time the European continent as a whole must ban the fear of the unknown by creating transnational opportunities for peaceful cooperation. If not—man has no choice but to cling to a national state that is the sole source of power, help and opportunity, and to build up a still more abstract machinery to be conquered again in one or the other of the unhappy nations by an unknown soldier who will rally the outcasts, select the ruthless, fool the fools and—with the help of still more efficient experts —unleash the forces of war and destruction against half-benevolent, half-ignorant observers.